The Internet has significantly reduced the marginal cost of producing and distributing digital information goods. It also coincides with the emergence of new competitive strategies such as large-scale bundling. In this paper, we show that bundling can create "economies of aggregation" for information goods if their marginal costs are very low, even in the absence of network externalities or economies of scale or scope.
1. When competing for upstream content, larger bundlers are able to outbid smaller ones, all else being equal. This is because the predictive value of bundling enables bundlers to extract more value from any given good.
2. When competing for downstream consumers, the act of bundling information goods makes an incumbent seem "tougher" to single-product competitors selling similar goods. The resulting equilibrium is less profitable for potential entrants and can discourage entry in the bundler's markets, even when the entrants have a superior cost structure or quality.
3. Conversely, by simply adding an information good to an existing bundle, a bundler may be able to profitably enter a new market and dislodge an incumbent who does not bundle, capturing most of the market share from the incumbent firm and even driving the incumbent out of business.
4. Because a bundler can potentially capture a large share of profits in new markets, single-product firms may have lower incentives to innovate and create such markets. At the same time, bundlers may have higher incentives to innovate.
For most physical goods, which have nontrivial marginal costs, the potential impact of large-scale aggregation is limited. However, we find that these effects can be decisive for the success or failure of information goods. Our results have particular empirical relevance to the markets for software and Internet content and suggest that aggregation strategies may take on particular relevance in these markets. (Bundling; Internet; Pricing; Information Goods; Software; Competition; Digital Goods) ginal costs of reproducing and distributing information goods to consumers and businesses.
1 This low marginal cost typically results in significant production-side economies of scale for information goods distributed over the Internet. Furthermore, several information goods are characterized by network externalities; i.e., they become more valuable to consume as their market share increases, which leads to demand-side economies of scale. It is well known that such technological economies of scale have important implications for competition, favoring large producers, and can lead to winner-take-all markets (e.g., see Arthur 1996) .
In this paper we analyze "economies of aggregation," a distinct source of demand-side economies for information goods that can be created by certain marketing and pricing strategies that bundle access to large numbers of information goods. Specifically, we study the effects of large-scale bundling of information goods on pricing, profitability, and competition. We show that bundling strategies can offer economies of aggregation favoring producers that aggregate large numbers of information goods, even in the absence of network externalities or economies of scale or scope. While earlier analyses (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999a,b) focused on the implications of bundling and other forms of aggregation for a monopolist providing information goods, this paper extends those models to consider the effects in competitive settings.
We demonstrate how marketing strategies that exploit these economies of aggregation can be used to gain an advantage when purchasing or developing new content. Firms can employ economies of aggregation to increase the value of new content, giving them an edge when bidding for such content. Economies of aggregation can also be used to discourage or foreclose entry, even when competitors' products are technically superior. The same strategies can also facilitate predation: A bundler can enter new markets and force a competitor with a higher quality product 1 In the remainder of this paper, we will use the phrase "information goods" as shorthand for "goods with zero or very low marginal costs of production." In particular, our basic analysis is motivated by the way the Internet is changing the dynamics of publishing (broadly defined to include all forms of digital content).
to exit. Finally, economies of aggregation can affect incentives for innovation, decreasing them for firms that may face competition from a bundler while increasing them for the bundler itself. The potential impact of large-scale aggregation generally will be limited for most physical goods. However, when marginal costs are very low, as they are for digital information goods, the effects can be decisive.
Our analysis is grounded in the underlying economic fundamentals of pricing strategy as applied to goods with low marginal cost. It can help explain the existence and success of very large-scale bundling, such as that practiced by America Online, as well as the common practice of hybrid publishers, such as the Wall Street Journal's bundling several distinct information goods as part of their online package even as they sell the same items separately through conventional channels. The same analysis can also provide insight into the proliferation of "features" found in many software programs. While our analysis is motivated by the pricing and marketing decisions that publishers face when they make their content available on the Internet, it may also apply in other markets where marginal costs are low or zero, such as cable television, software, or even conventional publishing to some extent.
Bundling Large Numbers of Information
Goods Bundling may enable a seller to extract value from a given set of goods by allowing a form of price discrimination (McAfee et al. 1989 , Schmalensee 1984 . There is an extensive literature in both the marketing and economics fields on how bundling can be used this way (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976 , Schmalensee 1984 , McAfee et al. 1989 , Hanson and Martin 1990 , Eppen et al. 1991 , Salinger 1995 , Varian 1997 . Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) provide a more detailed summary of the pertinent literature for large-scale bundling of information goods. Finally, the tying literature has considered the possibility of using bundling to leverage monopoly power to new markets (e.g., Burstein 1960 , Bork 1978 , with especially important contributions by Whinston (1990) on the ability of bundling to effect foreclosure and exclusion and related recent work (e.g., Choi 1998 , Nalebuff 1999 ).
Our paper builds on prior work by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) that considers the bundling of more than two goods and is focused on bundling information goods with zero or very low marginal cost. That article finds that in the case of large-scale bundling of information goods, the resulting economies of aggregation can significantly increase a monopolist's profits. The benefits of bundling large numbers of information goods depend critically on the low marginal cost of reproducing digital information and the nature of the correlation in valuations for the goods: Aggregation becomes less attractive when marginal costs are high or when valuations are highly correlated. We extend this line of research by considering how bundling affects the pricing and marketing of goods in certain competitive settings. Furthermore, by allowing for competition we can consider how large-scale bundling can create a barrier to entry by competitors, enable entry into new product markets, and change incentives for innovation.
The paper is especially motivated by the new marketing opportunities enabled by the Internet. Most earlier work in this area-such as papers by Bakos (1997 Bakos ( , 1998 , Brynjolfsson and Smith (1999) , Clemons et al. (1998) , Degeratu et al. (1998) , Lynch and Ariely (1998) -has focused on the effects of low search costs in online environments. Others, including Hoffman and Novak (1996) , Mandel and Johnson (1998), and Novak et al. (1999) , address how online environments change consumer behavior. In contrast, we focus on the capability of the Internet to actually deliver a wide class of goods, namely digitized information. The capability makes it possible not only to influence consumers choices but also to consummate the transaction via the Internet, and typically at much lower marginal cost than through conventional channels. While bundling strategies might have been considered relatively esoteric in the past, they become substantially more powerful in this new environment-and specifically, strategies based on very large-scale bundling become feasible.
While the focus of this paper is on bundling strategies, the Internet clearly affects competition in many other ways. For instance, lower search costs, network externalities, high fixed costs, rapid market growth, changes in interactivity, and other factors significantly affect marketing and competitive strategies. We abstract from these other characteristics of the Internet to better isolate the role of bundling on competition. Furthermore, we focus on equilibrium strategies, recognizing fully that many Internet markets are not in equilibrium as we write this paper. As a result, it can be dangerous to extrapolate from current behavior, such as below-cost pricing, currently observed on the Internet. Executives at Buy.com, for instance, report that their current hyperaggressive pricing strategy is driven by the need to establish a reputation for having low prices during the high growth phase of the Internet, even if that means currently losing money on some items. After this reputation is established, they do not plan to be quite as aggressive (although they still expect to be positioned as a relatively low-price outlet for most goods, Barbieri 1999) . By analyzing and understanding the equilibria that result when firms compete in markets for information goods, we hope to gain insight into which outcomes are most likely when temporary phenomena and disequilibrium strategies have dissipated.
Approach in this Paper
In § 2 we review the case of a monopolist bundling information goods with independent demands, and we provide the necessary background, setting, and notation for the analysis of the competitive implications of bundling. In § 3 we address upstream competition between bundlers to acquire additional information goods, as in the case of bundlers competing for new content. In § 4 we analyze downstream competition for consumers in a setting with information goods competing in pairs that are imperfect substitutes, including the case of a bundle competing with one or many outside goods. In § 5 we explore the implications of the analysis in § 4, discussing how bundling strategies affect entry deterrence, predatory behavior, and the incentives for innovation. Finally, § 6 presents some concluding remarks.
A Monopolist Bundling Information Goods with Independent Valuations
We begin by employing the setting introduced by the Bakos-Brynjolfsson bundling model, with a single seller providing n information goods to a set of consumers X. Each consumer demands either 0 or 1 units of each information good, and resale of these goods is not permitted (or is prohibitively costly for consumers).
2 Valuations for each good are heterogeneous among consumers, and for each consumer x ʦ X, we use ni (x) to denote the valuation of good i when a total of n goods are purchased. We allow ni (x) to depend on n so that the distributions of valuations for individual goods can change as the number of goods purchased changes.
3 For instance, the value of a weather report may be different when purchased alone from its value when purchased together with the morning news headlines because they both compete for the consumer's limited time. Similarly, other factors such as goods that are complements or substitutes, diminishing returns, and budget constraints may affect consumer valuations as additional goods are purchased. Even certain psychological factors that may make consumers more or less willing to pay for the same goods when they are part of a bundle (e.g., Petroshius and Monroe 1987) can be subsumed in this framework. However, for simplicity, we treat all goods as being symmetric; they are all assumed to be affected proportionately by the addition of a new good to the bundle. Let x n ‫ס‬ 1/n be the mean (per-good) valu-
ation of the bundle of n information goods. Let , , p* q* n n and denote the profit-maximizing price per good for p* n a bundle of n goods, the corresponding sales as a fraction of the population, and the seller's resulting profits per good, respectively. 4 Assume that the following conditions hold. We assume that the producers of information goods can use technical, legal, and social means to prevent unauthorized duplication and thus remain monopolists. However, Bakos et al. (1999) have employed a similar framework to study a setting where users share the goods. To simplify the notation, we will omit the argument x when possible.
Figure 1
Demand 
Assumption A3 implies that adding a good to a bundle cannot reduce the total valuation of the bundle (although it may reduce the mean valuation).
Under these conditions, it can be shown that selling a bundle of all n information goods can be remarkably superior to selling the n good separately. 6 For the distributions of valuations underlying most common demand functions, bundling substantially reduces the average deadweight loss and leads to higher average profits for the seller. As n increases, the seller captures an increasing fraction of the total area under the demand curve, correspondingly reducing both the deadweight loss and consumers' surplus relative to selling the goods separately. Proof. This is Proposition 1 of Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) . Ⅺ
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that as the number of information goods in the bundle increases, the law of large numbers assures that the distribution for the valuation of the bundle has an increasing fraction of consumers with "moderate" valuations near the mean of the underlying distribution. Because the demand curve is derived from the cumulative distribution function for consumer valuations, it becomes more elastic near the mean, and less elastic away from the 5 I.e., sup n,i,x ( ni (x)) Ͻ ϱ, for all n, i (i Յ n), and x ʦ X.
6
In the remainder of the paper, our focus will be on "pure" bundling-offering all the goods as a single bundle. "Mixed" bundling, which involves offering both the bundle and subsets of the bundle at the same time for various prices, will generally do no worse than pure bundling (after all, pure bundling is just a special case of mixed bundling), so our results can be thought of as a lower bound for the profits of the bundler. mean. Figure 1 illustrates this for the case of linear demand for individual goods, showing, for instance, that combining two goods each with a linear demand produces a bundle with an s-shaped demand curve. As a result, the demand function (adjusted for the number of goods in the bundle) becomes more "square" as the number of goods increases. The seller is able to extract as profits (shown by the shaded areas in Figure 1 ) an increasing fraction of the total area under this demand curve while selling to an increasing fraction of consumers.
Proposition 1 is fairly general. While it assumes independence of the valuations of the individual goods in a bundle of a given size, each valuation may be drawn from a different distribution. For instance, some goods may be systematically more valuable, on average, than others, or may have greater variance or skewness in their valuations across different consumers. Furthermore, valuations may change as more goods are added to a bundle. As shown by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) , Proposition 1 can be invoked to study several specific settings, such as diminishing returns from the consumption of additional goods, or the existence of a budget constraint. Thus, this analysis can also apply to the addition of new features to existing products; indeed, the line between "features" and "goods" is often a very blurry one.
Even the assumed independence of valuations is not critical to the qualitative findings. As shown by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) , many of the results can be extended to the case where consumer valuations are correlated. The key results are driven by the ability of bundling to reduce the dispersion of buyer valuations, and dispersion will be reduced even when goods are positively correlated as long as there is at least some idiosyncratic component to the valuations. In other words, valuations of the goods cannot all be perfectly, positively correlated. However, assuming zero correlation provides a useful baseline for isolating the effects of bundling and avoids the introduction of additional notation. Furthermore, we believe it is often a reasonable and realistic description for many online markets.
It is interesting to contrast the bundling approach with conventional price discrimination. If there are m consumers, each with a potentially different valuation for each of the n goods, then mn prices will be required to capture the complete surplus when the goods are sold separately. Furthermore, price discrimination requires that the seller can accurately identify consumer valuations and prevent consumers from buying goods at prices meant for others. Thus, the conventional approach to price discrimination operates by increasing the number of prices charged to accommodate the diversity of consumer valuations. In contrast, bundling reduces the diversity of consumer valuations so that in the limit, sellers need to charge only one price, do not need to identify different types of consumers, and do not need to enforce any restrictions on which prices consumers pay.
As the number of goods in the bundle increases, total profit and profit per good increase. The profitmaximizing price per good for the bundle steadily approaches the per-good expected value of the bundle to the consumers. The number of goods necessary to make bundling desirable and the speed at which deadweight loss and profit converge to their limiting values depend on the actual distribution of consumer valuations. In particular, it is worth noting that although the per-good consumers' surplus converges to zero as the bundle grows, the total consumers' surplus from the bundle may continue to grow, but only at a lower rate than the number of goods.
The efficiency and profit gains that bundling offers in the Bakos-Brynjolfsson bundling setting contrast with the more limited benefits identified in previous work, principally as a result of focusing on bundling large numbers of goods and on information goods with zero marginal costs. In particular, if the goods in the bundle have significant marginal costs, then bundling may no longer be optimal. For example, if the marginal cost for all goods is greater than their mean valuation, but less than their maximum valuation, then selling the goods separately at a price above marginal cost would be profitable. However, the demand for a large bundle priced at a price per-good greater than the mean valuation will approach zero as the bundle size grows, reducing profits. Thus, because of differences in marginal costs, bundling hundreds or thousands of information goods for a single price online can be very profitable even if bundling the same content would not be profitable if it were all delivered through conventional channels.
Upstream Competition for Content
In the previous section we focused on the case of a monopolist selling large numbers of information goods either individually or in a bundle. We now look at the impact of competition. In this section we analyze a setting with firms competing for inputs (e.g., content), and in the next section we analyze downstream competition for consumers in a setting with information goods competing in pairs of imperfect substitutes. In § 5 we consider how downstream competition may further affect the incentives of a bundler in the upstream market. Consider a setting similar to the one in § 2 with n goods. There are two firms, denoted as firm 1 and firm 2, selling information goods; we refer to them as the bundlers. These firms can be thought of as publishers selling information goods to the consumers, and we assume they start with respective endowments of n 1 and n 2 nonoverlapping goods, where n 1 ‫ם‬ n 2 ‫ס‬ n ‫מ‬ 1. We assume that consumers' valuations are i.i.d. for all goods. Thus different goods offered by the bundlers do not compete in the downstream market because they are not substitutes for each other.
7 For instance, a British literary online magazine might compete with 7 In other words, the bundlers are monopolists in the downstream market but not monopsonists in the upstream market. We disregard any effects by which one monopolist's sales might affect another monopolist via consumer budget constraints, complementarities, network externalities, etc.
an American online journal for the rights to a video interview even if they do not compete with each other for consumers, or an operating system vendor might compete with a seller of utility software to own the exclusive rights to a new data compression routine.
By postponing the analysis of downstream competition until § § 4 and 5, we can highlight the impacts of bundling on upstream competition for content. Furthermore, the assumption that the goods are identically distributed makes it possible to index the "size" of a bundle by simply counting the number of goods it contains. In this setting we analyze the incentives of the two firms to acquire the nth good in order to add it to their respective bundles. Specifically, we consider a twoperiod game. In the first period the bundlers bid their valuations (y 1 , z 1 ) and (y 2 , z 2 ) for good n, where y denotes a valuation for an exclusive license and z denotes a valuation for a nonexclusive license. 8 In the second period the nth good is acquired by one or both firms, depending on whether y 1 , y 2 or z 1 ‫ם‬ z 2 represents the highest bid, provided that this bid is higher than the stand-alone profits that can be obtained by the owner of the nth good. Subsequently, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously decide whether to offer each of their goods to the consumers individually or as part of a bundle (no mixed bundling is allowed), set prices for their offerings, and realize the corresponding sales and profits. Because of the zero marginal cost of providing additional copies of the information good, we want to allow for the possibility that the information good is made available to both bundlers. We thank a referee for this suggestion.
In this setting, if the bundles are large enough, it is more profitable to add the outside good to the bigger bundle than to the smaller bundle. More formally, Proposition 2 holds. Proof. Proofs for this and remaining propositions are in the appendix.
Proposition 2 builds on Proposition 1 by allowing for competition in the upstream market. It implies that the larger bundler (i.e., the one with the larger set of goods) will always be willing to spend the most to develop a new good to add to its bundle and will always be willing to pay the most to purchase any new good that becomes available from third parties. Proposition 2 can be easily extended to a setting with more than two bundlers, although the incentives for exclusive contracting may diminish as the number of competing bundlers increases.
In settings where the bundlers compete for new or existing goods one at a time, Proposition 2 implies that the largest bundler will tend to grow larger relative to other firms that compete in the upstream market, unless there are some offsetting diseconomies.
10 Of course, if one or both bundlers understand this dynamic and there is a stream of new goods that can potentially be added to the bundles, then each bundler defer the issue of downstream competition among bundlers until later in the paper. 10 We conjecture that the implications of Proposition 2 would be strengthened if the goods bundled were complements instead of having independent valuations (e.g., because of technological complementarities or network externalities). In this case, the economies of aggregation identified in Propositions 1 and 2 would be amplified by the advantages of combining complements. Furthermore, while we assume no downstream competition in this section to isolate the dynamics of upstream competition, the upstream result would not be eliminated if we simultaneously allowed downstream competition. In fact, as shown in § § 4 and 5, the ability to engage in largescale bundling may be particularly valuable in the presence of competition.
will want to bid strategically to race ahead of its rivals in bundle size and/or to prevent its rivals from growing. In this way, strategies for bundling are very similar to traditional economies of scale or learning-bydoing, as analyzed by Spence (1981) and others. The far-sighted bundler with sufficiently deep pockets should take into account not only how adding a good would affect current profits but also its effect on the firm's ability to earn profits by adding future goods to the bundle.
In conclusion, large-scale bundling strategies may provide an advantage in the competition for upstream content. Large-scale bundlers are willing to pay more for upstream content, because bundling makes their demand curve less elastic and allows them to extract more surplus from new items as they add them to the bundle. Because the benefits of aggregation increase with the number of goods included in the bundle, large bundlers enjoy a competitive advantage in purchasing or developing new information goods, even in the absence of any other economies of scale or scope.
Downstream Competition for Consumers
It is common in the literature to assume that goods in a bundle have additive valuations (see, e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976 , Schmalensee 1984 , McAfee et al. 1989 ). This may not be realistic, especially when the goods are substitutes and thus compete with each other for the attention of consumers. In this section we consider a particular case of downstream competition-i.e., competition for consumers-by analyzing a setting in which information goods are substitutes in pairs. In a setting similar to the one analyzed in § 2, consider two sets of n information goods A and B, and denote by A i and B i the ith good in A and B, respec- Even though for each i the valuations for A i and B i are independent, the two goods are substitutes in the sense that a consumer purchasing both goods A i and B i enjoys utility equal only to the maximum utility that would have been received from purchasing only one of the two goods. In other words, the least valued good in each pair does not contribute to the consumer's utility if the other good is also owned. For example, a consumer who prefers Monday night football to the Monday night movie does not get any additional value if she has rights to view both programs than if she could watch only football.
Assumption A4. For all i and all x ʦ X t consumer x receives utility equal to max( Ai , Bi ) from purchasing both goods A i and B i .
Finally, we assume that development of the information goods involves a certain fixed cost.
Assumption A5. The production of good A i , B i involves a fixed cost of j Ai , j Bi respectively.
We consider a two-period game with complete information. In the first period the firms invest j Ai , j Bj for all goods A i and B j that will be produced. 11 In the second period, the firms decide whether to offer each of the goods individually or as part of a bundle (no mixed bundling is allowed), set prices for their offerings, and realize the corresponding sales and profits.
As noted by Spence (1980) , it is important to understand that goods may be substitutes yet still not have 11 A good such as B i that has no substitute can be modeled by setting the fixed cost of the corresponding good A i to a value that would render its production uneconomical. 
Competitive and Monopoly Provision of Two Substitute Goods
We begin by considering the base case in which there is no bundling and thus the goods compete in pairs. This provides a benchmark for the subsequent analysis and allows us to introduce the setting. First we analyze the case when for each pair of goods two separate, competing firms each offer one good in the pair. Because of the independence of consumer valuations for goods i and j if i ϶ j, competition takes place only between the two goods in each pair. Thus our setting corresponds to n separate two-good markets. Dropping the subscripts indexing the pairs, suppose firm A provides good A and firm B provides good B. In this case, if firm A prices at p A and firm B prices at p B , the line-shaded areas in Figure 2 show the corresponding sales q A and q B , assuming that p A Ն p B . The assumption of uniformly and independently distributed valuations implies that consumers are evenly spread throughout the unit square, making it easy to map from areas to quantities demanded.
As shown in the appendix, the unique equilibrium has prices , quantities p* ‫ס‬ p* ‫ס‬ 2 ‫מ‬ 1 q* ‫ס‬ q* ‫ס‬ 
Ί
Given the above equilibrium in period 2, it is easy to see that any good with fixed cost less than ( 2 ‫מ‬ Ί will be produced when both firms offer competing 2 1) goods. When a competing good is not produced, the remaining seller prices at the monopoly price of 0.5, selling to half the consumers and earning a maximum gross profit from a single good of 0.25. Thus, if a good has fixed cost above 0.25, it will not be produced even by a monopolist. If one good has fixed cost below and the other good has fixed cost above same total revenues. This is a consequence of the fact that consumers do not derive additional value from their less-preferred good. Thus the monopolist cannot increase his profits by bundling a single pair of such competing goods.
Competition Between a Single Good and a Bundle
To understand how bundling affects competition, we now analyze how prices and quantities are affected if firm B may include its good in a large bundle. Specifically, assume goods A 1 and B 1 compete as above. In In the appendix we show that the optimal quantity for the resulting bundle of n goods will converge to one as the number of goods increases. In other words, Proposition 3 implies that as n increases, firm B's bundle, which includes good B 1 , is ultimately purchased essentially by all consumers.
12 Thus firm A must set its price for good A 1 given the fact that almost all consumers already have access to good B 1 . Figure 3 shows the 12 Under our assumptions, the quantity sold by the bundler grows monotonically (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, proposition 2) . Thus the effect of bundling will be steadily diminished, but not eliminated, for smaller bundles. fraction of consumers that will purchase A 1 at price p A1 , and thus firm A will choose p A1 to maximize (1 ‫מ‬ proximately 0.07. As shown in the appendix, firm B will increase its gross profits by at least 0.28 by adding B 1 to its bundle. Compared to competition in the absence of bundling, firm A has to charge a lower price (0.33 instead of 0.41), be limited to a lower market share (0.22 instead of 0.41), and achieve substantially lower revenues (0.07 instead of 0.17). By contrast, by including good B 1 in a large bundle, firm B will increase the revenues from the bundle by at least 0.28 and achieve market share close to 100% for good B 1 .
This phenomenon can be observed in the software markets. For instance, Microsoft Office includes numerous printing fonts as part of its basic package. This is easy to do given the low marginal cost of reproducing digital goods. This strategy has drastically reduced the demand for font packages sold separately while allowing Microsoft to extract some additional value from its Office bundle.
Finally, although consumers' valuations are uniformly distributed for good B 1 , the actual demand faced by firm B will be affected by the availability and pricing of good A 1 . Figure 4 shows the derived distribution of valuations faced by firm B for good B 1 when firm A prices good A 1 at p A1 . The impulse at the origin represents the fact that a fraction (1 ‫מ‬ p A1 ) 2 of the 1 2 consumers will purchase A 1 even if B 1 is offered at a price of zero. Given free disposal, we do not allow negative valuations. As expected, consumer valuations for good B 1 increase as p A1 increases.
Competition Between Multiple Goods and a Bundle
We now consider n pairs of competing goods, where one good in each pair may be part of a bundle. In particular, firm B offers goods B 1 , B 2 . . . B n as in the previous section, and it has the option to combine them in a bundle. Goods A 1 , A 2 . . . A n are offered independently by firms A 1 , A 2 . . . A n . Goods A i and B i compete just as A 1 and B 1 competed in the previous section (0 Յ i Յ n). As before, there is no private information, and the setting has two periods, with firms A 1 , A 2 . . . A n and B deciding whether to invest j Ai , j Bi , respectively, in period one. In period two, firm B decides for each good B 1 , B 2 . . . B n whether to offer it as part of a bundle or separately, and all firms set prices and realize the corresponding sales and profits. No mixed bundling is allowed.
The analysis of the previous section is still applicable in this setting with many pairs of substitute goods, be- 
As shown in § 4.2, as n gets large, the seller of a free standing good A i that competes against good B i that is offered in a bundle of n goods will maximize profits by charging approximately . Goods A i will be produced if j Ai Ͻ 0.07. Firm B will include good B i in its bundle when j Bi Ͻ 1/3 in the presence of a competing good A i , and when j Bi Ͻ 1/2 if there is no competing good. If fixed costs are between 0.07 and 0.33, then it is profitable for B to produce the good and sell it as part of the bundle even though it would be unprofitable for A to produce a similar good and sell it separately. Thus, a critical result of this analysis is that the bundler has an advantage competing in individual markets against individual outside goods. In § 5.4 we offer a more complete discussion of implications for entry, exit, and predation.
Competition Between Rival Bundles
In the setting of § 4.3, consider the case where goods A 1 , A 2 . . . A n are offered by a single firm A which, like firm B, has the choice of offering each of its goods individually as above, or as a bundle of n goods priced at p B1 . . . n per good, with resulting sales of q B1. . .n . Proposition 1 now applies to both firms, and ; i.e., almost all lim q* ‫ס‬ lim q* ‫ס‬ 1 n→ϱ A1. . .n n →ϱ B1. . .n consumers purchase both bundles. 13 The valuation Ai (x) for good A i given that consumer x already owns good B i is 0 with probability 0.5, and has the probability distribution function 1 ‫מ‬ Ai (x) for 0 Ͻ Ai (x) Յ 1. The corresponding mean valuation is
As n gets large, the optimal price equals the mean valuation, i.e., 13 Although consumers purchase both bundles, they do not necessarily use all the goods in each bundle. In our setting, a given consumer will use, on average, half the goods in each bundle-i.e., those that have higher valuations than the competing good in the other bundle. Thus, if the bundles are very large, in the unique equilibrium both A and B bundle at a price of 1/6 per good and almost all consumers buy both bundles.
A consumer x that owns both goods A i and B i enjoys utility equal to max( Ai (x), Bi (x)), and thus her expected utility is
Ai per pair of goods. Thus, in the case of rival bundles, as n gets large, the per good deadweight loss converges to zero, and consumers keep average surplus of 0.33 per pair of goods. If the bundlers merge, on the other hand, they can capture the consumer' surplus per Proposition 1, and in the process double their gross profit.
Discussion
In this section, we have analyzed downstream competition in a setting with pairs of substitute goods with independently distributed valuations. This setting can be easily generalized to multiple competing goods. The independence assumption greatly simplifies the modeling, and it is a useful working assumption in the same way simple logit models of consumer choice assume independence of valuations to simplify the analysis (Guadagni and Little 1983) , although this may not be strictly true. It should be pointed out, however, that the assumption of independent valuations is not essential for the results of this section. For instance, Proposition 3 states that a good facing competition is more profitable as part of a bundle. This strategic advantage to the bundler is derived by the ability to leverage the large market share of a large bundle; the bundler will extract higher profits from the outside good, as long as the price of the bundle can be adequately increased when the outside good is added. If consumers' valuations for the two goods are perfectly correlated, i.e., if the goods are perfect substitutes, Bertrand-Nash competition leads to zero prices when the goods are sold separately. In that case, the bundler will not be able to increase the price of the bundle when adding the outside good, and bundling will neither increase nor decrease the bundler's profit.
If the valuations for the two goods are not perfectly correlated, as long as the bundler can charge for adding one of the goods to the bundle at least one-half of the equilibrium price when the goods are sold separately, bundling will increase profits. Thus while the results derived in this section may be weakened if the valuations for the goods are correlated, they will still be qualitatively valid for a range of correlations, depending on the precise functional form from which the valuations are derived.
An easy way to see this is to consider the distribution of valuations shown in Figure 5 . This is a similar setting to the one analyzed in this section, except that we do not allow any consumer's valuations for the two goods to differ by more than 1 ‫מ‬ r where 0 Յ r Յ 1. When r ‫ס‬ 0 we get the independent valuations of our earlier setting, while r ‫ס‬ 1 corresponds to perfectly correlated valuations. Proposition 3 and the analysis in § § 4.2 and 4.3 will still apply as long as p A Ͼ r and p B Ͼ r. Thus as long as r Ͻ 5/18, the results in these sections will remain unchanged. It is interesting to contrast our results with Whinston (1990) . Using notation similar to our setting, Whinston considers a monopolist in good B 1 who is also offering good B 2 , which faces actual or potential competition from an imperfect substitute A 2 . Whinston shows that low heterogeneity in valuations for B 1 and high differentiation in the valuations for A 2 and B 2 will help reduce the entrant's profits, and thus may allow the monopolist to deter entry for A 2 . However, bundling may not be optimal after A 2 has entered, and thus may deter entry only if the monopolist can credibly commit to keep bundling if entry should occur. By contrast, in our setting, bundling a large number of information goods will be optimal whether or not entry occurs; and thus, as discussed in the following section, it will be more likely to effectively deter entry, increasing even further the incumbent's profits. Nalebuff (1999) considers a model with an incumbent monopolist offering two goods, but where entry will occur in only one of the two markets. The entering product is a perfect substitute, i.e., its valuation by consumers is perfectly correlated to their valuation for the existing product in that market; furthermore, the incumbent cannot change prices post-entry. Nalebuff focuses on the ability of bundling to deter entry, and his results are generally consistent with the ones derived in our setting, except that they apply to a case of perfectly correlated valuations. Nalebuff shows that high correlation in valuations, while it may reduce the postentry benefits from bundling, also reduces the entrant's profits and thus makes entry less likely. This reasoning also applies to our setting.
Finally, it should be noted that an incumbent bundler may find it possible to use predatory pricing to deter entry, while this practice may be hard to implement if the goods are sold separately, e.g., because of anti-trust considerations.
Implications for Entry Deterrence, Predation and Innovation
Summarizing the analysis of § 4, Table 1 shows the market shares, prices, and resulting revenues contributed by goods A i and B i when they compete under the different settings analyzed in § 4. In this section we discuss the implications of the above analysis for how the strategy of marketing and selling information goods as a bundle can affect competition and profits.
Bundling and Acquisitions
In the setting of Proposition 1, where all goods are independent of each other, as the number of goods in the bundle increases, revenues from the bundle increase monotonically. Because there are no fixed costs in this setting, the bundle becomes increasingly profitable. Interestingly, this result carries to the setting of § 4, in which the added goods may compete with other goods in the bundle. In other words, in addition to bundling goods in B, the bundler will also want to acquire goods in A. Proposition 4 holds. Proposition 4 implies that large bundlers of information goods will be willing to acquire related (i.e., competing) as well as unrelated information goods to add them to the bundle. As a result, a bundle may include competing news channels, such as a cable TV bundle that includes both CNN and CNBC. When acquiring both items in a competing pair of goods, a firm will be able to extract more profit by selling the pair as a bundle (0.66 in total profits) than by selling each item in the pair separately (0.38 in total profits). This contrasts with the case of a bundler of only two competing goods, in which no additional profits are gained by bundling. Furthermore, a firm's incentives to acquire a second good in such a pair are much higher if it intends to sell it as part of the bundle than if it plans to sell the good separately. The total revenues extracted from the pair of goods by all firms increase by over 0.26 when they are sold as a bundle.
14 The increase in profits is only 0.04 if the two goods continue to be sold separately. 
Bundling and Entry Deterrence
We now look at a bundler of a large number of goods facing a single potential entrant. For convenience we will focus on a potential entrant considering whether to offer good A 1 , competing against good B 1 in the bundle. Because B 1 is part of a large bundle, the entrant in 14 Before acquisition, the revenues are no more than 0.33 for the good in the bundle plus 0.07 for the outside good. After acquisition, they are 0.66 when they are sold as a bundle, for a gain of at least 0.26. 15 The sum of the profits of the competing firms is 0.34, while the profits rise to 0.38 if both goods are sold separately by a single profitmaximizing firm. effect faces a more "aggressive" incumbent: As shown in § 4.2, it is optimal for the incumbent bundler to price the bundle so that he maintains a market share of almost 100%, even after entry. As far as the demand for the entrant's good is concerned, it is as if the incumbent is credibly willing to charge almost zero for good B 1 . As a result, entry will be deterred for a broader range of entry costs. 16 For instance, if good B 1 is part of a bundle then it would be unprofitable for a potential competitor to enter and sell A 1 as long as his fixed costs exceed 0.07. In contrast, as shown in § § 4.1 and 4.2, the entrant could profitably enter with fixed costs as high to 0.19 if B 1 were sold as a stand-alone good. Thus firms with fixed costs between 0.07 and 0.19 will be deterred from entry if B 1 is made part of the bundle. By continuity, this result can extend to the case where the bundling incumbent has slightly higher production costs than the single-product entrant, a product on the average valued less than the entrant's product (i.e., 16 This is similar to the result in Whinston (1990) , except that in our model the power of the incumbent's bundle derives from the large number of goods in it, not from an inherent characteristic of any particular good. In our model, large scale bundling may be profitable, even when bundling two goods is not.
lower "quality"), or both. In each of these cases, the entrant will not find it profitable to enter despite a superior cost structure or quality level.
This argument also applies in the case of a bundler of n goods facing n potential entrants. If the n goods A i ʦ A in the setting analyzed in § 4.3 are seen as potential entrants competing with the goods B i in set B, Corollary 2 follows for large values of n. It should be noted that the "aggressive" pricing of the bundler and the resulting entry deterrence is not based on any threats or dynamic strategies, e.g., artificially lowering prices in the short run to prevent entry. The bundler is simply choosing the price that maximizes profits in the current period. It happens that the optimal pricing policy for the bundler also has the effect of making entry very unattractive. Of course, this can make bundling even more profitable if it reduces competition.
Coordinated Entry by Offering a Rival Bundle
If the potential entrants can offer a rival bundle (e.g., if they merge or can coordinate their entry and pricing), they may be able to profitably enter the incumbent's markets. Specifically, if the entrants all enter simultaneously as a bundle, then they can all gain sufficient market share to stay in business, even if they would have had to exit had they entered separately. The intuition for this result is that when the entrants offer their own bundle of products that compete with the original bundle, then a large number of consumers will find it worthwhile to purchase both bundles because there is no correlation among the valuations of the goods in each bundle, which means that for each pair of goods, each consumer is equally likely to find his preferred good in either bundle (see § 4.4 above). Thus, if they can coordinate and offer a competing bundle of the A i goods, the n A firms will find it profitable to enter even for fixed costs as high as 0.18. When fixed costs are between 0.07 and 0.18, it is unprofitable for the firms to produce the A i goods and sell them separately, but it is profitable to produce and sell them as a bundle that competes with the B bundle. Consumer welfare is significantly increased by the availability of the competing bundle, increasing from little more zero if only one bundle is sold with no competitors to about 0.33 if both bundles are sold.
Bundling, Predation, and Exit
We now consider the case in which the incumbent firm sells a single information good and the entrant sells a large bundle of unrelated goods. This case is the reverse of the case in § 5.2: If the incumbent sells good A i and a bundler sells a large bundle of unrelated goods B ‫מ‬ B i , then the bundler can enter the new market by adding good B i to its bundle, even if it would have been unprofitable to enter the market with a stand-alone good.
The reason is that, as shown in § 4.2, the equilibrium for competition between a bundler and a seller of a single good with identical production costs and quality leaves the bundler with the majority of the market and higher profits, while the profits of the single-product firm are reduced. If production were just barely profitable for a single product firm selling good A i competing with another single product firm selling good B i , then it would become unprofitable for a singleproduct firm selling good A i competing with a bundler selling good B i as part of a large bundle. For instance, in the setting of § 4.2, the act of bundling could force a competing firm to exit if its fixed costs were greater than the 0.07 that would be earned when competing with a bundler. Without bundling, the same firm would not have exited as long as its fixed costs were greater than the 0.17 that could be earned when competing with another single-product firm. Similarly, there is a range of fixed costs for which entry is profitable if and only if the entrant sells a bundle. If there are fixed costs of production, then the incumbent may find it unprofitable to remain in the market with a reduced market share. As a result, the bundler can successfully pursue a predatory strategy of entering new markets and driving out existing firms.
If the entrant did not have a superior product or cost structure, this strategy would not be credible or successful if the entrant sold its products separately. A threat to temporarily charge very low prices in an attempt to drive out the incumbent would not be credible if the entrant's goods were sold separately. If the incumbent did not exit, the entrant would not be willing to follow through on such a threat; it would not be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. However, the mere fact that the entrant has the option of including the new good as part of an existing bundle will immediately make it a more formidable predator. Now, it is credible for the entrant to charge low enough prices to maintain a very high market share. What's more, even with this "aggressive" pricing strategy, the entrant will be more profitable when it bundles its products than it would be if it did not bundle. Thus, even when the incumbent has lower fixed costs, lower marginal costs, or higher quality than the entrant, it may be forced to exit when the entrant uses the bundling strategy.
Bundling and Incentives for Innovation
Assume that firm A is considering an investment in a market that does not currently face any competition. It can create an innovation at some irreversible cost and enter the market. Suppose second firm could, for the same fixed costs and marginal costs and with a similar quality, follow the first firm into the market, leading to a competitive equilibrium between imperfect substitutes, as in § 4.2. For a range of values, this equilibrium will result in sufficient profits for the first firm to undertake the innovation, even in the face of potential entry by a similar firm. If fixed costs are somewhat higher, the equilibrium duopoly profits will be sufficiently lower than the monopoly profits that the first firm will enter the market, but the second firm will not. In either case, the innovation will be undertaken. While we assume that the costs and benefits of the innovation are deterministic, the analysis can be readily generalized to stochastic values.
However, now the second potential entry is a bundler of a set of similar goods in different markets. As in the analysis of predation above, an entrant who is a bundler can quickly capture most of the market share in the new market. Knowing of this possibility, what are the firm A's incentives for innovating? Clearly, firm A will find it less profitable to innovate and create new markets because it cannot keep as large a share of the returns. Instead of earning the monopoly profits or half the total duopoly profits, firm A will keep only a fraction of the market and much lower profits (0.07 in the setting above). Incentives for innovation by such firms will be reduced, and fewer innovations will be funded and undertaken.
This result is consistent with claims by some entrepreneurs that venture capitalists will not fund their ventures if there is a significant risk that a competing product might be incorporated into a large bundle sold by a potential predator. The investors are, rightly, especially fearful of a potential competition by a firm that already controls a large bundle of information goods. A potential competitor who merely sells a stand-alone good cannot as easily take away the market from the innovator.
It is important to note that the effect of bundling on innovation extends beyond the product markets in which the bundler currently competes. If a potential innovator believes that a bundler may choose to enter some new market that could be created by the innovator, then the innovator's incentives will be reduced. Some innovations will be unprofitable in this situation even if they would have been profitable to undertake had there been no threat of entry by the bundler or if the only possible entry were by stand-alone goods.
However, this is not the end of the story. While the single-product firms will have reduced incentives to innovate, the bundler will have greater incentives. It can earn greater profits by entering new markets than the single-product firms could. Thus there will be a shift of innovative activity from stand-alone firms to bundlers. Whether the ultimate equilibrium will involve a higher or lower total level of innovation will depend on the ability of the different types of firms to succeed with innovations. Furthermore, the types of innovations that the bundler will undertake can be expected to differ systematically from the types of innovations pursued by standalone firms.
Concluding Remarks
The economics of aggregation we identify are in many ways similar in effect to economies of scale or network externalities. A marketing strategy that employs largescale bundling can extract greater profit and gain competitive advantage from a given set of goods. Economies of aggregation will be important when marginal costs are very low, as for the (re)production and delivery of information goods via the Internet. High marginal costs render large-scale aggregation unprofitable, which may explain why it is more common in Internet publishing than in publishing based on paper, film, polycarbonate discs, or other relatively high-cost media.
Our analysis of bundling and competition showed that:
1. Large bundles may provide a significant advantage in the competition for upstream content.
2. The act of bundling information goods makes an k k k k condition follows from inequality (11a) in Schmalensee (1984) , and the second condition follows from differentiating that inequality. Proposition 1 implies that . In the lim y ‫ס‬ lim y ‫ס‬ l n →ϱ 1 n →ϱ 2 1 2 case of nonexclusive provision of the single good, if it is provided outside both bundles, Bertrand competition will result in a zero equilibrium price. As n 1 and n 2 get large enough, both bundles achieve a market share close to 100%. Thus if the good is provided as part of one bundle only, at equilibrium the outside good will realize revenues close to zero while the bundler will be able to incrementally extract lower revenues than when having exclusive rights to the good. If both bundles include the good, neither bundler will be able to extract revenues from it since (almost) all consumers will already have access to it via the other bundle. Thus it follows that as n 1 and n 2 get large enough, y 1 Ͼ z 1 and y 2 Ͼ z 2 , and at least one of z 1 and z 2 converges to zero. Thus lim max(y , y , z ‫ם‬ z ) ‫ס‬ y , 1 2 1 2 1 n ,n →ϱ 1 2 which proves the proposition. Ⅺ Section 4.1. Equilibrium for Competing Substitute Goods At equilibrium, neither firm benefits from lowering its price, taking the price of the other competitor as given. The gray-shaded area in Figure A- Figure 2 , and equal new sales of dp A , and sales d(1 ‫מ‬ p A ) taken from good A. The corresponding increase in revenues is dp revenues of (approx. 0.38). 2 3/9 Ί Alternatively, the monopolist can sell only one good at a price of 0.5, with resulting sales of 0.5 and revenues of 0.25. Finally, as consumer valuations for the two goods are i.i.d., consumers do not derive additional value from their less preferred good and the goods have zero marginal costs, if the monopolist bundles A and B he will price the bundle at , and sell quantity , for the 1/ 3 q* ‫ם‬ q* ‫ס‬ 2/3 Ί A B same total revenues of . Thus the monopolist cannot increase 2 3/9 Ί his profits by bundling a single pair of competing goods. 
